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Sugar Policy and Reform  Interventions  in sugar  markets
come  about  for many
reasons.  Often the
Donald  F. Larson  consequences  of these
Brent Borrell  policies  persist  even  when the
circumstances  that  motivated
them  change.  Or  the
underlying  problems  that
motivated  past  interventions
remain  even  when it's clear
that  current  approaches  have
failed.  Reform  of sugar
markets  needs  to go beyond
eliminating  failed  policies-
and find lasting  solutions.
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Summary findings
Reviewing cross-country experience with sugar policies  stocks, and factor markets-which  not only dictate the
and policy reform, Larson and Borrell conclude that  starting point for reform but also determine which
long-standing government interventions-rooted  in  reform paths are feasible.
historical trade arrangements, fear of shortages, and  Experiments with public ownership, common in many
conflicting interests between growers and sugar milts-  countries, have not succeeded. So most countries have
often displace both the markets and the institutions  initiated some measure of market reform. And events
required to produce efficient outcomes. Arrangements  relating to NAFTA, Lome, and expansion of the EU may
rooted in colonial eras still shape policies and trade in  bring about significant changes in the EU and U.S. sugar
the United States, the European Union, and many  regimes, with cascading effects on other countries.
developing countries.  Common problems in the sector include determining
Once policies and institutions are put in place,  cane quality, finding methods for fairly sharing revenues
households and the value of investments grow dependent  from joint production, finding ways to take advantage of
on them, even as their usefulness fades. Firms and  preferential trade arrangements with minimal negative
households make decisions that are costly to reverse. And  consequences, finding ways to finance and encourage
the result is a legacy of path-dependent  policies, in which  research and other activities with common benefits,
approaches and instruments are greatly influenced by  identifying practices that facilitate equitable, sustainable
past agreements and previous interventions.  privatization, and determining the relationship between
The cumulative effects of these interventions are  sugar market reform and markets in land, water, credit,
embodied in livelihoods, political institutions, capital  and other inputs.
This paper-a  product of Rural Development, Development Research Group-is  part of a larger effort in the group to
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Web athttp://'econ.worldbank.org. The authorsmaybe  contacted at dlarson & worldbank.orgor bborrellI@  intecom.com.au.
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Introduction
This paper provides lessons about sugar policies and the process of sugar policy
reform by selectively drawing on cross-country experiences. A general conclusion is that
long-standing government interventions frequently displace both the markets and the
institutions required to produce efficient outcomes.  In addition, based on long-standing
policies, households and firms make decisions that are costly to reverse.  Consequently, the
outcomes of earlier policies and events affect the pace and process of reform. This view of
markets may apply generally to commodity markets. But the political economy, trade
structures, and production characteristics of sugar are different enough from those found in
most agricultural markets to warrant special consideration. Chief among these differences are:
*  The degree to which international markets are dominated by policy interventions and the
effects of preferential trade arrangements;
*  The inherent tension between mills and growers created by sugar's joint-production
characteristics;
*  The local monopoly-monopsony relationship between growers and mills; and
*  The effect of that relationship on community incomes, assets, and profitability.
Because of these factors government interventions are common.  The result is a legacy
of path-dependent policies, where approaches and instruments are greatly influenced by past
agreements and previous interventions. The accumulated effects of these interventions are
embodied in livelihoods, political institutions, capital stocks, and factor markets-elements
that not only dictate the starting point for reform but also determine which reform paths are
feasible.
To an exceptional level, domestic sugar policies in many countries are shaped by the
policies of a few large countries.  The policies of these countries have their roots in historic
events. This chapter discusses at length the history and current characteristics of thesepolicies, related trade arrangements and the way the policies of large countries shape those of
smaller economies.
The paper reviews literature that quantifies the benefits of policy reform; however the
emphasis is on describing those characteristics of sugar policy, markets, and production that
shape the process of reform. We draw lessons from domestically driven reforms and from
reforms forced by historic events. The emphasis on reform is perhaps surprising, given that
almost all countries intervene in sugar markets. However many countries began the process of
domestic reforms in the 1  990s, including privatizing mills and estates. And a number of
developments on the international scene are likely catalysts for further reforms. These
developments include the anticipated expansion of the European Union (EU), the effects of
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) on U.S. and Mexican policy, the
regional effects of reform on Brazil's sugar industry, and discussions under World Trade
Organization auspices.
Global Markets
Protected markets, special trade arrangements and prices that are remarkably volatile
characterize the sugar trade. At the same time the market for freely traded sugar is large and
deep compared with other agricultural commodities. Sophisticated and liquid financial
markets (forward, futures and derivatives) supplement the physical trade. Understanding this
unusual blend of free and protected markets is important for policymakers during the process
of domestic market reform for several reasons. First, producer groups often base successfully
arguments for government protection on the policies of other countries. Second, many market
interventions are long-lived, and the accumulated results these interventions generate can
complicate the reform process. Accumulated investments in land, capital and human resources
are often premised on domestic policy interventions or special access to protected markets in
the EU or United States. In a few countries, such as Fiji and Mauritius, export earnings from
sales to protected markets are important to the economy as a whole, contributing significantly
to national incomes, currency reserves and government revenues. For these countries, policy
changes in destination markets can have macroeconomic consequences.
Understanding the variability in the sugar market and the secondary and derivative
markets for sugar is useful as well. Government interventions to stabilize sugar prices can
2crowd out international markets as risk maniagement  instruments and inhibit the development
of domestic risk management practices. Conversely, the international markets for risk
management offer opportunity to mitigate the consequences of volatility introduced by
domestic reforms.
Government Interventions Around the World
Sugar is a basic food consumed in all countries. The Food and Agricultural
Organization (FAO) reports that 133 countries produce sugar. Sugar is widely traded, with
annual trade constituting around 26 percent of annual production. However, a handful of large
countries produce and consume most of the world's sugar figure 4.1.) In addition most large
producers-China,  the EU, India, and the United States-all  intervene in the sugar trade in
ways that affect international prices. I Many other countries intervene in one form or another
in domestic markets, and only the smaller market share of these countries keeps their
individual interventions from significantly affecting global markets.
In preparation for the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations (1986-94) participants
agreed on a common method of analyzing the effects of policy interventions. Although the
method has acknowledged limits, it allows comparisons of policy effects across diverse
interventions such as quotas, export subsidies, and interventions in input markets. 2
Quantitative estimates of the positive and negative effects of policy elements on producers are
summed and divided by output to calculate an estimated producer subsidy equivalent (PSE)
per ton. A similar process produces a consumer subsidy equivalent (CSE) that measures the
effects of agricultural policy on domestic consumers. The Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) institutionalized these calculations for industrial
countries now calculates these measures annually.
Between 1982 and 1992 all sugar-producing industrial countries protected domestic
sugar at the expense of consumers. Most countries did so at significant levels. On average
from 1993 to 1995 producer subsidies in OECD countries were equal to about 49 percent of
the world price (OECD, 1997.) The CSE measure for the same period was -46 percent-that
Brazil is an exception.
2 For example, this method is not designed to measure the effects of exchange rates policies. Krueger, Schiff
(date) [Neither author in reference list]. Among the critics of this method are Strokov and Meyers (1996).
3is, the implicit tax on consumers was equal to 46 percent of the average world price (table
4.1). Among industrial countries only Australia has chosen to dismantle its trade barriers since
1995.
The motivations and objectives of sugar policies in developing countries are more
diverse and often contradictory. Some countries, such as Zimbabwe, have attempted to keep
consumer prices low, and until recently Brazil used export restrictions to foster its domestic
ethanol industry. Generally, however, most governments in developing countries, in pursuit of
self-sufficiency, attempt to protect domestic industries, some of which are state owned. Often
this protectionism results in higher prices for consumers, as it does in Chad and the Ukraine.
But some countries, including China and India, use input subsidies from central or state
budgets as well.
The Effects of Policies on the World Market and Domestic Welfare
What are the effects of different types of policies on international markets? The
prevailing opinion is that market interventions lower international prices significantly while
increasing price volatility. 3 A GATT panel ruled that the regime of the late 1970s in the
European Community had depressed world prices (Harris, Swinbank, and Wilkinson 1983.).
Table 4.2 reports estimates of the effects of various policies on world sugar prices. Valdes
(1987) and Borrell and Duncan (1992), among others, point out that sugar liberalization
studies are generally not comparable. Some of the studies in the table cover a range of
commodities, while others focus only on sugar. In addition the effects are measured against a
baseline that differs from study to study. Yet once the effects are converted into a common
measure (cents per pound, 1990 terms), average estimates from 1960 of the effects on prices
do not differ significantly from more recent estimates.  These similarities persist despite
differences in method and the significant policy and market changes that took place in the
interim.
The EU and the United States use international markets to manage domestic sugar
surpluses and shortfalls, as do other large sugar-consuming and -producing countries. In doing
3  The consensus is not, however, unanimous.  Hannah (1997) points out that investments and technological
developments in alternative sweeteners may make supply less elastic than it is generally believed to be.
4so they pass their production and demand uncertainties on to the international market, and
international prices are thus more volatile than they would be under free-trade agreements. In
addition to the EU and the United States, Brazil, China, and India have pursued domestic
policy regimes in which shortfalls or surpluses in domestic supply were managed through
adjustments in trade (figure 4.2).  A few studies measure the effects of policy on market
volatility; these suggest that the effects of policy on short-term price volatility are
considerable (table 4.2).
The EU uses import substitution and export subsidies to protect domestic markets.
The EU has the largest export subsidy program, but the EU program is not unique; Colombia,
Mexico, Poland and South Africa, among others, subsidize sugar exports as well. As part of
the Uruguay Round of the GATT, several countries pledged to reduce subsidized exports of
sugar. The promised reductions, which are to be in place by 2004, equal 1.3 million tons-
approximately the same amount as exports from the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of
States (ACP) into the EU.  Nonetheless, these same countries retain the right to subsidize
nearly 5.4 million tons of sugar (table 4.3)
Many of the studies on sugar polices also measure the distribution of benefits.
Included are measures of transfers between producers and consumers, between rich and poor
countries, and among firms. 4 For example, in their review, Jabara and Valdes (1993) report
that protection in industrial nations reduced the foreign exchange earnings of poor exporters
by $2.2 to $5.1 billion per year in 1980 dollars. Moreover, studies that measure welfare
transfers do not attempt to measure the effects of policy on factor allocation. Since many of
these factors are fixed-for  example, investments in milling and improvements to land-
policies become imbedded in capital and other factor stock, and their effects are long lived.
Prior to recent reforms, interventions put in place during the first International Sugar
Agreement in the 1  930s were costing the Australian sugar industry over $200 million a year
by 1990 (Borrell, Quirke and Vincent 1991). Similarly before reforms commenced in Brazil,
policy interventions were costing Brazil an estimated $2.5 billion a year (Borrell, Bianco, and
Consequently, the positive effects of reform on international prices may become evident only after a lengthy
period of adjustment.
4For  example, see Barry and others (1990) [not in reference list] for a report on the concentration of benefits in
the U.S. fructose corn syrup market and Webb, Lopez and Penn, (1990) [not in reference list] on the subsidy
component of sugar producer revenue in developed countries.
5Bale,  1994.) Estimates  for India  suggest  that allowing  existing  policies  to continue  unchanged
could cost  the economy  around  the same  amount($2  billion  a year)  by 2004  (World  Bank
1996).
How the Policies of Large Countries Affect Those of Small Economies
The policies  of countries  that dominate  the sugar  market  influence  those  of less
important  players  in two significant  ways. First,  the pervasive  interventions  of the larger
countries  encourage  others  to institute  protectionist  policies.  The influence  can be indirect
(through  unilateral  trade  policy)  or more  explicit,  especially  during  the negotiation  of regional
trade  agreements  such as the agreement  of the Association  of Southeast  Asian  nations
(ASEA),  NAFTA,  the planned  EU  expansion,  the MERCOSUR  and proposed  regional
agreements  Africa.  Second,  special  access agreements  often  result  in domestic  sugar
industries  that are dependent  on externally  determined  policies  and give  rise  to domestic
policies  designed  to allocate  rents  from the access agreements.  Examples  include  domestic
sugar  policies  in Fiji,  Cuba,  the Philippines,  and  Zimbabwe.
Protection  and  Trade Agreements
Because  interventions  by  large countries  depress  world prices,  international  prices
undervalue  the domestic  resources  employed  in sugar  production.  To address  this  imbalance
countries  generally  choose  to ignore  the ongoing  opportunity  to consume  cheap  sugar  and
instead  erect protective  tariffs  that more than  compensate  domestic  producers  for the effects
of the policies  of large  economies.  In negotiations  concerning  trade,  countries  tend  to
aggressively  defend  their  capacity  to increase  protection  further.  During  the Uruguay  Round
of the GATT, the EU, Japan,  and the United  States were  able to preserve  their protective
sugar  trade  policies  through  special  annex  provisions  to the general  agreement,  while  most
developing  countries  sought  to bind tariffs  well  in excess  of applied  levels.5 For  1995, sugar
exporters  on average  bound  their tariffs  at 92 percent;  sugar importers'  tariff-bindings
averaged  117 percent.  By 2004  the tariff bindings  will average  79 percent  for sugar  exporters
and 98 percent  for sugar  importers  (see tables  4.4  and 4.5)
5Sugar  was an extreme example of the way countries commonly managed the tariffication of the agricultural
sectors during the Uruguay Round (Hathaway and lngco 1996).
6Regional trade agreements frequently must address differences in sugar policies.  For
example the United Kingdom's entry into the European Community in 1973 and its
commitments under the 1951 Commonwealth Sugar Agreement significantly changed
European sugar policy. The Commonwealth Agreement formalized traditional colonial sugar
imports and gave Commonwealth countries preferential access to the UK and Canadian sugar
markets. The UK negotiated a continuation of the agreement's preferences that ultimately
resulted in the sugar protocol of the Lome Convention. The protocol allows sixteen countries
in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific preferential entry into the protected EU market. Two
countries, Fiji and Mauritius, hold roughly half the annual quota of approximately 1.3 million
tons (figure 4.3).
Generally, regional agreements tend to propagate the protectionist policies toward
countries outside the agreement.  Poland is an example where protectionist policies were
introduced in anticipation of a regional agreement.  In the early 1990s, Poland was in the
process of privatizing its domestic sugar market while pursuing regional trade agreements
with the EU. The legislative outcome was the September 1994 Sugar Industry Act, which
established both the country's  sugar marketing policy and its privatization policy. Under the
act, the Council of Ministers sets domestic production quotas for the domestic market (A-
quota) and for subsidized exports (B-quota). Additional sugar (C-sugar) must be exported
without subsidies. Levies on A- and B-quota sugar are intended to finance export subsidies.
The domestic market is protected by high tariff rates, and minimum farm prices are supported
through purchases by a government agency. In addition some countries are granted special
access to the Polish market under the Central European Free Trade Agreement. For example,
in 1998 Romania was granted an allowance of 5,000 tons of raw beet sugar at a reduced tariff.
The terms of trade in sweeteners between the United States and Mexico embodied in
NAFTA also illustrates how regional agreements can propagate protectionist policies.
Following a period of increasing government intervention, the Mexican government
nationalized sugar mills during the 1  970s. The experiment proved unsuccessful, and by 1990,
when plans for NAFTA were first announced, Mexico had completed a substantial
privatization of its sugar mills. Following privatization the government put in place fixed
tariffs of 10 and 15 percent for raw and refined sugar, respectively. The result was a larger-
than-anticipated flow of imports, and prices fell (Figure 4.3).
7In January 1991 the government intervened, setting a reference price defended by a
variable tariff.  The variable tariff remained in place as the terms of NAFTA were negotiated 6
The agreed-upon terms of NAFTA called for a 15-year phased-in reduction in tariffs between
the United States and Mexico that began on January 1, 1994. In addition, the governments of
Mexico and the United States agreed to harmonize their tariff schedules for non-NAFTA
countries by 1999.  Shortly after signing the agreement, Mexico quickly moved its tariffs to
near-US levels.
The NAFTA example also illustrates how new policy interventions can generate
unexpected consequences and prompt policy-based irreversible investments.  The Mexico-US
agreement affected tariffs for sugar and other sweeteners - most notably High Fructose Corn
Syrup (HFCS.) The boost to tariffs provided a boon for the Mexican sugar industry, and new
investments in sugar increased. But the protection also created opportunities for the
manufacture of alternative sweeteners, since tariff rates for high-fructose corn sweeteners
were to fall faster than sugar tariffs. (Table 4.6) By 1996 imported sweeteners had begun to
compete with domestic sugar as Mexican and U.S. firms announced new investments in
Mexico. This was due in part to the fact the advantage NAFTA temporarily afforded corn
sweeteners over sugar provided an opportunity for the HFCS industry to cover the high fixed
costs associated with transportation systems and corn wet-milling plants.  Consequently the
industry was able to capture some of the benefits Mexican negotiators had expected to flow
the smallholder cane producers and newly privatized Mexican sugar mills.
Dependence  on the Trade Policy  of Other  Countries
Special access arrangements are an important component of the international sugar
market. Two significant programs-the  U.S. and EU programs-are  especially long-lived. As
already mentioned, the Lome Agreement gives quota-based preferential access to the
protected EU sugar market by number of countries in Africa, Asia and the Caribbean with
past colonial ties to Europe. The US provides preferential access to developing countries as
well. Tariffs for imported sugar were an early source of revenue for the United States.
Preferential treatment developed later and first became an important policy instrument to
6 The NAFTA  sweetener  agreement,  which  covered  sugar  and high-fructose  corn syrup,  proved  especially
contentious.  One particular  point  of disagreement  was a side-letter  that  amended  the language  of the signed
8protect US interest - especially in Cuba. From 1934 until 1974 the United States employed
import quotas and marketing allotments to manage domestic output and prices (Schmitz and
Christian 1993.) At this time, countries that earlier had been granted tariff preferences were
granted quotas along with domestic producers.  During the volatile period from 1975 to 1981
when sugar prices reached record hights, the United States experimented with several
programs, including some that obligated the government to purchase sugar at a minimum
price. Tariffs were managed to prevent large government outlays. In 1982 quotas were
reintroduced, and a modified tariff-quota scheme remained in place in 20007. The U.S. Trade
Representative rather than the U.S. Department of Agriculture manages the allotment of
quotas to traditional U.S. trading partners (Table 4.7).
Access to the protected U.S. and EU markets can be valuable. For example, Sturgis,
Field, and Young (1990) estimate that U.S. sugar policies transferred as much as $120 million
to the small economy of the Dominican Republic in 1984. Wong, Sturgis, and Borrell (1989)
estimate that the Lome sugar protocol transferred more than $200 million to Mauritius in
1985. The programs can also reduce the risk of price volatility for countries with special
access. Herrmann and Weiss (1995) for example, calculate that 17-42 percent of the welfare
benefits associated with the EU program come from stabilization effects.
While the transfer and stabilization benefits are clearly significant, the effects of
special access on development are subject to debate. For example, while reviewing the effects
of the Lome commodity protocols, the EU concluded:
The impact of trade preferences has been disappointing by and large. Preferential
arrangements, especially the protocols on specific products, have contributed significantly to
the commercial success of some countries that managed to respond with appropriate
diversification policies. But the bulk ofA CP countries have lacked the economic policies and
the domestic conditions neededfor  developing trade (European Commission, 1996)
Similarly, the World Bank (1995) found that Fiji's preferential access to the EU and
U.S.markets generated limited development impact. 8
version.
7Domestic  marketing allotments were reintroduced briefly in 1990.
8 Prasad and Akram-Lodhi (1998) [not in reference list] challenge this view. The authors also note that
challenges to special access arrangements are likely to succeed and call for an orderly transition to free markets.
9Under the EU and U.S. programs the lion's share of special-access quotas go to a few
countries. However, even when the share of the total quota itself is relatively small, the effect
on small sugar industries in small countries can be large and the sugar industry in some
countries is highly dependent on special trade arrangements. In a handful of small countries,
the agricultural sector and general economy rely on sugar and special trading arrangements as
well. According to data from the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), between 1994
and 1996 10 countries depended on sugar exports for more than 10 percent of their export
earnings (figure 4.4.) All had special trade arrangements during the period.
Special trade arrangements in sugar can be profitable while they prevail, but
depending on foreign policy rather than world markets can be risky. Unlike market-related
risks, policy changes tend to be abrupt and impossible to hedge. The turbulent history of the
Cuban sugar industry illustrates this point.9 The Cuban sugar industry grew fivefold between
1904 and 1925, reaching 5 million tons, which constituted 23 percent of world production.
Most of the sugar went to the protected U.S. market under a special trade arrangement. At the
time U.S. companies were heavily invested in Cuba. Pollitt (1988) reports that by 1927, direct
U.S. interests in Cuban sugar mills, railroads, and land exceeded $600 million, partly because
U.S. banks foreclosed on several large sugar mills in 1921. Pollitt also notes that U.S.-owned
mills owned or leased 40 percent of Cuba's farmland in 1926-27 and accounted for an
estimated 60 percent or more of output. By 1929 Cuban exports (some 77 percent of the
island's  sugar production) met half of U.S. sugar consumption. The livelihood of nearly two-
thirds of the Cuban population depended directly or indirectly on sugar (Braga, 1997).
In 1930, however, as the Depression hit the United States and domestic demand fell,
the U.S. government moved to protect domestic producers and territorial production in
Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines. By 1932 Cuban sugar production had fallen to about
2.5 million tons and sold at much lower world prices. Workers'  incomes dropped
significantly, and during the 1933 revolution, farmers and workers seized many of the sugar
mills. Following the revolution, the Cuban share of a much smaller U.S. market fell to 25
percent, and sugar production fell to slightly more than 2 million tons. The reduced export
levels were institutionalized in the Jones-Costigan Act of 1934, which also granted the
9 Pollitt  ( 1988) provides  an interesting  account  of this "first"  sugar crises.
10Philippines an increased quota of 1 million tons -- later reduced to 800,000 tons. Between
1929 and 1933, 38 mills were shut down. However, because local communities were
dependent on the mills for their livelihood, the government had intervened to reopen 32 mills
by 1937.
Cuban sugar production recovered during World War II, reaching 6 million tons in
1947. About half of Cuba's sugar went to the protected U.S. market, while the rest entered the
world market. But the Cuban Revolution of 1959 and the U.S. embargo of 1960 brought about
a structural change in the Cuban economy and the sugar industry. During the next three
decades, Cuba became dependent on Soviet-bloc countries not only as outlets for sugar but
also (and more importantly) as trading partners for inputs, especially petroleum. (Pollitt 1988;
Pollitt and Hagelberg 1994.) During the 1970s the implicit transfers grew (Early and Westfall
1996) (figure 4.5).10  This relationship affected technology choices as well as decisions about
output levels. When the Soviet bloc collapsed, the second Cuban sugar crisis occurred. From
1990 to 1992 production fell from 8.2 million tons to 7 million tons. As Pollitt and Hagelberg
(1994) point out, the loss of premium sugar prices and Soviet credit facilities exacerbated
falling export volumes, and Cuba's import capacity fell from 8.1 billion pesos in 1989 to 2.2
billion pesos in 1992. The 1993 crop fell to 4.2 million tons, costing the country over $450
million in lost export revenue (figure 4.6.)
Special trade arrangements often give rise to domestic controls that affect how the
benefits are distributed. The domestic arrangements in turn lead to entitlements. The
Philippine market-sharing arrangement, the quedan, illustrates this point. Following the U.S.
takeover of the Philippines in 1898, Philippine sugar interests were granted a series of
preferences, partially at the expense of Cuban interests. These preferences were formalized in
the already-mentioned Jones-Costigan Act of 1934. Subsequently, the Philippine government,
following guidelines set out by the U. S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), surveyed the
sugar industry and established a three-part quota, comprising an allocation for the U.S.
market, one the domestic market, and one for reserves (Nagano 1988.) The three quotas were
allocated to 47 mill districts and the hundreds of smallholders in each district. Conflicts over
cane pricing arose, especially during the 1930s. A sugar-sharing arrangement existed in most
11milling districts, but a series of surveys by the newly established National Sugar Board in the
1930s revealed large discrepancies in the percentage of sugar taken by the mill. The board
instituted guidelines limiting the millers' share to 30-54 percent in Luzon and 31-52 percent
in Negros.
The system has grown in complexity but remains in place. The U.S. quota of 1.7
million tons comprised 12 percent of the 1998-99 quedan established by the Sugar Board's
successor agency, the Sugar Regulatory Agency. Domestic markets are protected with a 65
percent tariff. Current policies result in market-sharing among Philippine firms.  This distorts
marginal pricing - that is, production decisions are based on average revenues, in contrast to
systems where marginal production is forced onto world markets at world prices and marginal
production decision are therefore based on marginal profits.  The system also provides
distorted incentives as production levels also potentially affect the allocation of access to
protected US markets.  Consequently, firms that do not fare well in domestic markets may
nonetheless survive because of profits from sales into the US market.  In addition, fixed
revenue sharing between producers and millers discourage millers from achieving better
extraction rates. "
Mauritius provides an example of the way in which dependence on special access can
generates legislative barriers to diversification. In that country special conditions for workers,
special land market regulations, and other regulations specific to the sugar industry lock in
resources to ensure Mauritius produces enough sugar to meet its EU quota. As a result,
opportunities for productivity-enhancing diversification are limited and most arable land is
devoted to sugar production - nearly 70% in 1998 (FAO 2000).
While special access to protected markets generates potential benefits, the allocation
of those benefits depend on domestic policies and domestic sugar industries do not always
retain the benefits of special trading arrangements. Mlambo and Pangeti (1996) argue that in
Zimbabwe governments, intent on pursuing political expedience, often set domestic prices
below the cost of production during the transition to independence in 1979 (and subsequently
0' Because the ruble was not convertible, measures of implied subsidies are open to challenge. See Earley and
Westfall (1996), Pollitt and Hagelberg (1994), and Perez-Lopez (1988) for further discussion.
See Borrell and others (1994) for a discussion of the costs of Philippine policies.
12throughout much of the 1  980s). This policy transferred profits resulting from special access to
the EU and U.S. markets from the four private estates to domestic consumers.
In Fiji, the sugar industry, dependent on special access to the EU and US markets,
generates about 22 percent of GDP, 40 percent of agricultural GDP, and 40 percent of the
country's export earnings. The program has brought marginal lands into sugar production and
some benefits are vested in potentially higher land prices.  Still, much of the land had been
farmed under 30-year leases negotiated around 1970. As the leases expire, the fight over the
amount of the benefits of these trade arrangements that should be reflected in land rents has
been bitter. The conflict is especially acrid because Indian-Fijians comprise 75 percent of
Fiji's  sugar farmers, and 73 percent of Indian-Fijians lease their lands (Reddy and Yanagida
1998).
Policies, Sugar Markets, and Sugar Production
Like the international sugar market, domestic markets are characterized by extensive
interventions and a complicated political economy. As mentioned earlier many of the
interventions are based on special long-standing trade arrangements. Other issues important to
dorhestic markets relate to the role of sugar as a basic food item, the physical characteristics
of sugar production, and certain features of the industry's organization and of factor
ownership.
Food Security
Because sugar is a basic food item and because sugar prices are volatile, governments
often intervene in sugar markets with the purpose of maintaining food security. But while it is
often important as a basic food item, sugar is nowhere a diet staple comparable to rice, maize,
or a handful of other crops. Governments nevertheless apply similar policies to a handful of
"essential" food commodities that often includes sugar.  Sugar policies in China and India
illustrate this generality.
Current policy in India dates back to the Defense of India Act of 1939, which aimed to
limiting speculation and hoarding during World War II, and to the tragic Bengal famine of
1942 that claimed 2-3 million lives (World Bank 1996.) In 1955 the Essential Commodities
Act established a wide range of policy instruments to control the storage, trade, and prices of
13food crops, including sugar. Over the years both the central and state governments imposed
additional controls on the industry. In India, sugar is produced by almost 5 million
smallholders on plots that are generally less than one hectare. The country has more than 400
sugar mills, of which 60 percent are cooperatives, 15 percent are publicly owned, and the
remaining 25 percent private. Until the end of the 1990s, when the government began to grant
licenses to private traders, the State Trading Corporation monopolized imports and exports.
Import levels are still set by policy. The federal and state governments also subsidize farm
inputs, especially water and fertilizer, and sometimes offer soft loans to mills. Mills are
restricted in the amount of land they can own and may purchase cane only from administered
zones.
The genesis of China's sugar policy is harder to trace, but the 1959-62 famine that
killed 15-30 million people influenced the drive for self-sufficiency in all food items,
including sugar (Riskin 1995.)12  Domestic and trade policies are not consistent, however, and
provide contradictory incentives. Trade with other countries-and  sometimes trade among
regions-is  subject to regional and central government controls, and the government owns
many sugar mills. Domestic sugar prices tend to be high-around  50 percent more than
international prices in 1997 (FAO 1997.)
Production Characteristics, Land and History
Sugar production has two cost components: field and processing. For most agricultural
crops, production, storage, and processing are independent activities, and markets exist for
both processed and unprocessed commodities.  But field and factory costs in the sugar
industry (from cane to raw sugar) are interdependent. Despite this, fully integrated sugar
companies are unusual outside of sub-Saharan Africa. 1 3 In most countries, sugar producers
and processors are separate economic entities that can achieve economic efficiency only
through cooperative behavior.
12 Ironically, the food shortages resulting from the failed Great Leap Forward also pushed the government
toward a heavy reliance on internal market mechanisms.
13  Fully integrated sugar industries frequently originated as colonial plantations and in many instances were
nationalized at the end of the colonial era. Often the nationalized sugar companies retained monopolies or other
special privileges. In Indonesia, for instance, the Dutch plantations were converted into government-owned
"people's  plantations." In Chad a colonial company was transformed into joint venture between the government,
the private sector, and a French multinational.
14Sugar cane is bulky and degrades soon after harvesting. The high cost of transporting
it creates local monopolies and monopsonies.  Conflicts between producers and processors are
common and are often exacerbated by the need to share costs. For example, minimizing field
costs often requires a planting and harvesting cycle that produces cane for processing during a
relatively short period. But the increased sugar processing capacities needed during this
period raise mill owners' fixed costs.  Spreading deliveries over an extended period
minimizes processing costs. As a result scheduling and pricing conflicts often emerge
between producers and processors.  Frequently, the conflicts spill over into political
confrontations.
Land policies and ownership often influence sugar policies as well, for two reasons.
First, policies on land ownership influence the organization of the industry, usually by
limiting the scope for integrating production and processing. Second, since the value of land
for sugar production and sugar producers' income levels depend on proximity to an efficient
sugar mill, investment and production decisions tend to become matters of public debate in
areas with many small or medium-sized cane growers. For this reason governments often
intervene to take over or failing sugar mills.  Governments, on the whole, are rarely good at
running sugar mills, and often the acquired sugar mills are later resold to the private sector. 14
The history of sugar production in Mexico illustrates these themes. Prior to the
Mexican Revolution, large landowners controlled and integrated cane cultivation and
processing. The revolution resulted in a restructuring of the industry.  Morelos , the center of
the peasant-based Zapatista Movement, was also the heart of the country's  sugar industry
(Crespo 1988.) By 1921 many of the country's sugar mills had been destroyed and much of
the irrigated sugar-growing land transferred from the large plantations to peasant
cooperatives. A new and successful structure emerged based on smallholder cane producers
and private sugar mills with concentrated ownership.'5 The implicit mill cartelization was
formalized in 1932 with the establishment of Azuicar,  SA,  a miller-owned organization that
14Although  small  and medium-sized  producers  complicate  the political  economy  of the sugar industry,  family-
owned  farming  systems  are among  the world's most efficient  sugar  producers.  Family ownership  creates  strong
incentives  toward  long-run  stewardship  and reduces  the costs of monitoring  performance.  In terms of efficiency,
smallholder  farms  in Thailand  compare  favorably  with large  and medium-sized  sugar farms  in Australia,  France,
and the United  States.
15was granted a marketing monopoly on sugar. The association set quotas and organized
exports of subsidized sugar in order to maintain domestic prices above world levels.
Financing was organized through a government-subsidized bank, Banco Azucareros, SA.
Despite these changes tensions between growers and millers remained high, and in
1938 the industry was reorganized. Government ministries were allocated voting rights in the
cartel. Over time the government's role in the affairs of the sugar industry grew. Because
local economies depended on the sugar mills, the mills were not allowed to fail. In many
instances the government took over mills that were no long viable or that had been at the
center of disputes with growers.  By the mid-1980s the government owned 75 percent of the
country's sugar mills, which by law could not own or lease land for cane production. Azucar
retained its marketing monopoly. The government intervened further by subsidizing cane
growers, paying agricultural insurance premiums, and mandating special social security
payments for sugar producers. Prices were regulated along the entire marketing stream.
Producer prices were not directly linked to wholesale prices, and cane growers received a
common payment regardless of the sugar content of their cane. Government-owned sugar
mills were overstaffed and productivity levels declined. Despite it's  monopoly, Azuicar  began
running deficits that the treasury was forced to absorb (Tellez 1995.)
Rules on cane-pricing and revenue sharing
In the examples above governments chose to solve the conflicts between can
producers and mill owners through forced vertical integration. Another approach involves
mandating revenue-sharing rules. The value of cane delivered to a mill is determined by the
sugar content of the cane and the ease with which the mill can extract the sugar. High-value
cane has a low fiber content, a high sucrose content, and high juice purity-that  is, low levels
of soluble impurities-and  be free of debris. The quality of cane delivered to the mill is
affected by many factors along the production chain: natural endowments such as rainfall and
soil quality; production methods, such as the variety of cane that is planted and the methods
used to harvest it; and the promptness with which the cane is delivered.
15  By 1934 the top six [use English word here] ingenios  processed about 56 percent of the country's  sugar
(Crespo 1988.)
16Unfortunately pricing systems that create the proper incentives require a degree of
sophistication that is difficult to legislate and is likely to arise only from truly cooperative
approaches. Poorly conceived approaches, while easier to administer, encourage misdirected
efforts. For example until recently growers in Colombia were paid according to the weight of
the cane they delivered to the mill. The practice encouraged cane production but discouraged
attention to quality. In Mauritius, the Philippines, and South Africa, sugar revenues are shared
according to a fixed rate. Consequently, a portion of the efficiency gains generated by new
investments in sugar mills accrue to the cane growers. The practice effectively taxes
improvements in milling efficiency. Table 4.7 provides a cross-section of various cane-pricing
methods. 16
More on factor markets.
As mentioned previously the political economies of land and sugar are often
intertwined. But land and sugar policies can be linked in other ways as well. In the Philippines
only 10 percent of sugar cane farms are irrigated, although the returns to irrigation are
substantial, increasing yields by 60-70 percent. Uncertainty over land reform is perhaps the
primary reason so little land is irrigated.  This uncertainty limits the incentives for land
improvements. In a 1990 survey by the Management Association of the Philippines 60
percent of respondents who together hold 72,000 hectares said that they had reduced or put
off farming investments because of uncertainty over land reform (Borrell and others 1994).
Sugar cane production in St. Kitts and Nevis occupies almost'half the islands' arable
land. The sugar enters into the United States and the EU under preferential trade
arrangements. In 1975 the government intervened to nationalize the failing sugar industry,
acquiring 52 privately owned estates and one sugar factory. As a result the government
became the largest property owner in St. Kitts.  In 1992 the government began leasing out
land under 35-year agreements.
Water policies are often linked to sugar policies as well. Mlambo and Pangeti (1996)
provide a step-by-step account of the efforts made by Zimbabwe's  governments to provide
water to the country's  sugar-growing area. In 1970 the government of Senegal signed a
16 See LMC  (1997)  for a more  complete  discussion  of the details,  benefits,  and drawbacks  of the various  cane-
pricing  methods.  [LMC  not in reference  list]
17special agreement with the Compagnie Sucri&re  du Senegal the firm that provided with a free
99-year lease on land near Guiers Lake, with guaranteed free access to irrigation water (up
20,000 m3/ha). The agreement also granted the company production and trade monopolies
that were protected by quotas and tariffs. The arrangement remained in place for nearly 25
years, effectively immobilizing regional irrigation and land assets (World Bank 1995.) And
in India states and the national government provide farmers with access to subsidized water,
power, fertilizer, and credit. Because producing sugar requires more of these inputs than most
other crops in India, the policies favor sugar over other crops. Because rainfall and soil
conditions differ across regions, the subsidies also favor some geographic areas over others
(World Bank 1996.) Sugar processing is capital intensive, requiring large fixed investments.
Mills must acquire working capital to cover the period between the harvest, when mills buy
cane, and the eventual sales of processed sugar. When governments direct credit to mills and
farmers, sugar market reforms depend on the ability of mills, farmers, and financial
institutions to forge new structures. During times of economic hardship, the new structures
can be severely tested and sometimes fail. The Mexican experience again provides an
effective example. During the privatization of the country's mills in 1990, many facilities
were purchased using leverage buyouts, with the mill serving as the collateral. When the
financial crises hit the Mexican market and interest rates rose dramatically, the highly
indebted mills were unable to raise working capital. In September 1995 a debt-restructuring
package worth 8.2 billion pesos was offered through Financiera Nacional Azucarera
(FINASA), a Mexican development bank -- a move that meant FINASA's  entire portfolio
would be tied up in sugar-related assets. 17
Sugar Market Reforms: Why and How
Policy interventions are pervasive in sugar markets, affecting global and domestic
prices, incomes and investment decisions. Sugar markets were largely exempted from the
trade reforms negotiated during the Uruguay Round of the GATT. However, a number of
countries began the process of freeing domestic markets in the 1  990s. As with other
commodity markets, external events forced changes in some countries (see chapter 1). Often
sugar reforms come as part of a broader agenda of economy-wide reforms, sometimes a
17  In some  instances smallholder debt can burden local or even national banking systems as well.  Reddy and
18consequence of changing regimes and sometimes with the encouragement of multilateral
lenders.
Governments that collectively and individually intervened to manage commodity
prices and price volatility began dismantling those instruments and looking to private markets
and market instruments to manage risk during the 1990s (Larson, Varangis and Yabukil998.)
Sweeping changes brought about by the break-up of the Soviet Union markedly altered the
trade patterns of the former republics and their trading partners. Most countries, like Bulgaria,
Poland, Hungary, Latvia, Russia, and Ukraine took the first tentative steps toward creating
private markets for sugar behind protective tariffs. Similarly, in Indonesia the East Asian
economic crisis triggered trade liberalization for several commodities, including sugar,
although the government remains a significant owner of sugar mills and plantations.
Broad policy changes affecting the role of government, often the result of new
electoral mandates, sparked domestic reforms in sugar industries in Brazil, Mexico, and Peru.
Changes in the policy approaches of international institutions to agriculture in development
and the role of government in commodity markets also influence market reform-indirectly
through policy debate and directly through policy-based lending. Finally, the demise of the
commodity agreements in coffee and cocoa brought commodity-market reform to several
countries (for instance, Brazil and Uganda), generating  concurrent reform of the domestic
sugar markets.'8 Often reforms are less sudden, motivated partly by a growing recognition of
the failure of the public sector to perform and partly by the urging of donors and multilateral
lenders. In Africa-for  example in Chad, C6te d'Ivoire, and Kenya-the  sugar industry is
undergoing a slow process of privatization.
Many of the factors that motivated government intervention remain, however. In
particular special trade arrangements still dominate exports from several countries, tensions
between producers and processors are inherent in the organizational structure of many sugar
industries, and conflicts remain over how to manage and price scarce water resources. And
sugar reforms often take place amid reforms in factor and other markets. Thus while the
motivation to reform is often present, opposing forces can slow down the reform process.
Yanagida (1998) point out that Fijian banks depend heavily on sugar.
19Australia:  Freeing  Markets
Before Australia reformed its sugar policies, it maintained stringent production and
marketing controls. These were first implemented in the 1930s to comply with the first
International Sugar Agreement. Imports were restricted and regulations established a two-tier
pricing worked to the disadvantage of domestic consumers. In Queensland, where most of the
country's  sugar is grown, the Queensland Sugar Board set annual limits on the amount of
sugar each mill could provide to the higher-priced "number 1 pool." Amounts above quota
were sold into the lower-priced export market. Farmers and processors discovered that they
could profitably compete, even at intemational prices and production expanded. Despite the
implicit transfer from consumers to producers via the "number 1 pool", marginal investment
decisions were based on international prices.  The industry, especially in Queensland, grew
less dependent on domestic markets. Gains in milling efficiency flowed to millers, and
farmers captured increases in field productivity because of well-structured cane pricing rules.
Reforms began in 1989-90, when an import tariff replaced the import ban. The
Australian and Queensland Governments reviewed the country's sugar policy in 1996. The
review process itself was considered integral to the reforms because it established a broadly
accepted factual basis for discussion. As a result of the review, the government eliminated
that import tariff in July 1997 and converted the sugar board to the Queensland Sugar
Corporation. The nev; corporation retains its monopoly on sugar marketing but sells to local
refiners at export-parity prices. In general the industry received the changes well. The reforms
attracted new investments, and both production and milling capacity expanded. Nevertheless
adjustment difficulties occurred in the smaller New South Wales industry, which was more
dependent on domestic markets. In response, the Australian government initiated a study
examining ways the government can assist the industry during transition.
Brazil:  Unwinding  Cross-Subsidies
In the 1  990s Brazilian policymakers began reforming long-standing policies that
originated during the oil shocks of the 1970s (Borrell, Bianco and Bale 1994). Brazil is one of
the largest and most efficient sugar producers in the world, but for two decades up to two-
18 Earlier agreements on sugar were unsuccessful as well. See Gilbert (1985, 1987, 1996) for a brief history of
20thirds of its output was devoted to producing ethanol for the country's  subsidized alternative
fuel program, PROALCOOL. The government managed domestic supplies, allocating quotas
allocated to each of the more than 370 sugar mills and distilleries. The quotas were earmarked
for the domestic sugar and ethanol markets, and above-quota production was eligible for
export (and subject to export taxes). However, quotas were reallocated annually, and
production above quota was frequently rewarded with a larger quota the following year.
Domestic prices for sugar and ethanol were set to encourage the use of sugar for ethanol and,
for most years, the world price of sugar exceeded the domestic price. Further, regional
producers faced differential tax rates on sugar and on ethanol purchase prices. Beginning in
1995 steep export taxes replaced licensing as the primary instrument for managing sugar
trade, ushering in the first of many reforms.
Part of the reform process involves disentangling the interrelated controls on Brazil's
sugar and ethanol markets. In 1996 the government took several important steps in this
direction by reducing and then eliminating the export tax on sugar and deregulating the
market for anhydrous alcohol (a sugar cane-based alcohol blended with domestic gasoline).
In addition the government transferred the alcohol subsidy from fuel distributors to alcohol
producers and moved toward establishing a uniform tax on sugar production.  9 The reforms
aim in part to limit subsidies to a fixed quota per mill, so that additional alcohol production
will be sold at market prices. The government also began looking at alternative ways to
20 finance the program, including a "green-tax" on gasoline.  By 1999, the deregulated sugar
industry remained dependent on policies toward domestic alcohol and fuel policies. Related is
the composition of Brazil's vehicle fleet. Cars produced in Brazil are of two types: cars that
run on alcohol alone and others that run on a blend of alcohol and gasoline.  During the 1980s
most new Brazilian cars were alcohol powered (96% in 1986). This level dropped sharply in
the 1  990s and by 2000 99% of new Brazilian cars ran on blended fuel.  The changing
composition of the vehicle fleet translates into lower demand levels for alcohol.  To stimulate
demand, the government mandated government purchases of cars powered by renewable
commodity agreements.
19 Prior to October 1997 the government taxed producers in high-cost production areas at lower rates.
20  Brazil's reforms to its sugar-ethanol marketbegan at a time when markets in "green energy"-usually  wind or
hydro-based-were  developing in Australia, Canada, and the United States. Further, the Clean Development
21energy sources and offered incentives to taxi drivers to buy alcohol powered cars.  In addition,
the government uses alcohol inventories to manage alcohol prices, affecting the decision by
sugar mills on whether to produce alcohol or sugar from cane.  In 1999, the government also
temporarily boosted the required alcohol content of blended fuel (from 20 to 24%) in order to
boost demand.
Thailand: Limiting the Distortions from Preferential Prices
Although costly to consumers, Thai sugar policies are designed so that marginal
production decisions are based on world prices.2' Under the Thai program imports are banned
in order to raise domestic consumer prices. Sugar is produced under three categories: A quota
(for domestic consumption), B quota (for export under long-term contracts), and C quota  (for
export at world prices). Around 60 percent of Thailand's sugar is produced as C-quota sugar.
The A and B quotas are fixed each year, so the industry knows any additional production will
command only world prices. Thus, while the program transfers income from consumers to
producers and millers, the transfers do not affect marginal production decisions.
Net revenue from the three types of sugar sales is split 70:30 between producers and
millers, based on the average recoverable sugar content as determined by sampling.
Averaging the sugar content discourages individuals from improving cane quality, but millers
benefit by improving extraction rates and are penalized if extraction rates fall below 70
percent. Consequently, the system encourages millers to maintain their facilities. Thailand's
approach can be useful for countries receiving preferential access to either EU or U.S.
markets. The Thai system contrasts sharply with the approach taken in the Philippines, where
preferential access to the U.S. market distorts marginal incentives.
Pricing Cane: Cooperative Strategies from Jamaica and Mexico
Well-conceived cane pricing systems reward farmers for delivering high-quality cane
to mills in an orderly fashion without penalizing farmers for  the inefficiencies of the mills
themselves. Jamaica, which has many smallholder producers,  developed a sophisticated set of
Mechanism established under the Kyoto Protocol should have facilitated this process. See Jacoby, Prinn and
Schmalensee (1998.)
21  Borrell et al. (1994) provide a useful contrast between the incentives established by the Thai and Philippine
sugar policies.
22incentives by continually improving its can pricing system. The country had a tradition of
paying cane growers that dated back to 1943. The system-based  on individual measures of
quality-was  modified over the years. Factory efficiency entered the payment formula in
1972, and reforms in 1991 reforms put in place a revenue-sharing scheme based on relative
performance. In the Jamaican system, revenues are shared according to a 62:38 ratio when
growers produce cane of average quality and millers achieve average efficiency. But growers
receive higher prices for higher-quality cane, and millers earn more when efficiency
improves, so the revenue shares differ from mill to mill. Sampling techniques and incentives
to monitor can are also more sophisticated (LMC 1997.) The system ensures that, at the
margin, increased revenues from improvements in cane quality accrue to the grower, while
millers capture any gains from milling efficiency.
Developments in Mexico show how improvements in incentives can be introduced
even in a constrained environment. As part of a set of economy-wide reforms, the Mexican
government began the process of reforming the sugar industry. Two important legislative
changes affected land ownership and cane pricing. In 1992 changes to the Mexican
constitution allowed mills to enter into leasing arrangements with smallholders, although in
practice large-tract leasing by sugar mills is rare. More significant in the short run, a
presidential decree introduced a new cane payment system beginning with the 1991-92
season. The decree established a revenue-sharing system that divides the proceeds of sugar
sales between cane growers and millers. Cane from many smallholders is assembled at the
mill in group loads. Mill officials and growers' representatives monitor the cane deliveries.
Penalties established by a committee of mill owners and growers are applied based on debris
content and on delays in delivering the cut cane. Growers are paid based on average quality
levels and a set amount based on the efficiency of the mill (EBF)", which provides a
theoretical rate of recovery for the mill. When the system was first introduced, mills were
assigned individual EBFs, but by the 1994-95 season all mills had been assigned a common
EBF of about 82 percent. On average mill efficiency in Mexico is closer to 80 percent. The
system encourages mills to make efficiency gains, since any improvements accrue to the
mills-and  indeed several mills have exceeded the official EBF. Once the sugar content has
been established, an average price for standard sugar is used to value it, and this calculated
23value is split according to annual government directives. In 1996-97, the growers received 57
percent (LMC 1997).
The Mexican example also shows how initial conditions and practical limits shape
changes in pricing schemes. Because of the traditional government practice of setting pan-
Mexican sugar prices, wholesale markets for domestic sugar are not well established and
setting an average price for standard sugar is difficult. Consequently the price is negotiated
rather than established by market indicators. In addition, the system still prices sugar based on
average cane purity and fiber content, penalizing growers who delay deliveries following
cutting and growers that deliver debris. The system encourages some easy-to-measure
improvements in quality but not a more sophisticated arrangement that  also provides
incentives for growers to deliver cane at off-peak times. However the presidential decree
allows mills and growers to negotiate alternative systems that are mutually beneficial. At San
Cristobal, the largest sugar mill in Mexico, growers agreed to temporarily price their cane
according to actual factory efficiency rates when the mill owners promised to invest $50
million dollars to improve the plant's efficiency.
Privatizing Sugar Mills
Privatization is a common component of domestic sugar reforms. Most countries have
concluded that the state is ill suited to running sugar mills. The process of privatization often
reveals conflicting policy objectives, however. One goal of liberalization is to bring the
benefits of a more efficient sugar industry to sugar consumers.  But the need to generate
treasury revenues, or quickly eliminate drains on treasury resources can also encourage
governments to seek quick privatization solutions.  Moreover, governments often face
considerable pressure to ensure that privatization does not result in mill closures.  As a result,
government's often boost protection in order to improve the value of the mill and speed
privatization. Governments also face a number of other issues during privatization, including
how to cope with often large accumulations of debt and how to provide potential investors
with the information they need to make wise investment decisions.
24Using trade protection.
In practice most countries provide- high levels of protection to newly privatized sugar
mills, at least temporarily. In providing this protection governments implicitly tax future
consumption to finance the current government budget. Alternatively governments can fix
low rates of protection that are reflected in the value of the mills and in the prices bid during
privatization. In some cases, however, state-owned mills deemed viable in the long run are so
poorly maintained that they fail to cover variable costs at low rates of protection. For political
and budgetary reasons, governments are reluctant to subsidize the purchasing firms directly
and instead choose to tax future consumption in order to protect producers and workers
In Poland, for example, one purpose of the 1994 Sugar Industry Act was to provide a
stable and profitable environment for the sugar industry (albeit at the expense of Polish
consumers) during the privatization of the industry. 22 High protection rates and even export
subsidies were used to boost the attractiveness of the mills to potential buyers.  Nonetheless,
the government still owns most of the industry.23 In  Cote d'Ivoire the government, although
bound by its GATT pledge to limit sugar tariffs to 33.3 percent, chose to provide added
protection while privatizing its industry. The government provided this added protection by
basing its 33.3 percent tariff on a reference price that included prices from protected EU and
U.S. markets. In effect the system provided a tariff in excess of 100 percent for sugar
imported from world markets. The government of Burkina Faso chose lower average rates of
protection but established safeguard mechanisms based on a moving average of world prices
to protect the newly privatized industry from sharp price declines.
Writing off debt.
Resolving debt issues is often a key component of the privatization process. The question of
how to resolve large accumulations of debt can slow the privatization process, as it has for
Muhoroni, a sugar parastatal in Kenya.  Firms that would otherwise find the company
attractive are unwilling to bid after considering the on-going cost of servicing the debt that
was accumulated during government management.  In Brazil, sugar mills borrowed heavily
22 The sugar  industry  was privatized  as part of the economywide  privatization  begun in 1989.
23 Of  the 76 sugar  refineries  in Poland, 13  are completely  privatized,  and all but 2 have issued  shares.  Foreign
companies have significant investments in 10 of the mills and controlling interest in at least 4.
25from the Sugar and Alcohol Institute Sugar Export Fund during the creation of Brazil's
alcohol-fuel program. By 1996 the Bank of Brazil had been forced to renegotiate the debt,
then valued at $4.5 billion. Several Brazilian firms remained burdened by the earlier program
to provide ready access to credit.
Some governments are more willing than others to write off debt early in the
privatization process. This approach provides a direct incentive for private investment and
may leave newly privatized firms in a better position to raise working capital. And, as the
earlier example from Mexico shows, failure to resolve debt during the privatization process
may result in new interventions later.
The handling of debt was central to the Peruvian privatization process. 24 In 1969 the
military government launched a sweeping agrarian reform program that began with the
expropriation of the sugar plantations. Cooperatives were established and charged with
running the mills, but in 1975 conflicts developed between the management of the
cooperatives and sugar cane growers. The government experimented with several different
kinds of controls  as the financial integrity of the sugar mills crumbled. In the early 1990s
legislation freed cooperatives to dismantle or reorganize their structure, and four of the
smallest sugar cooperatives chose to do so. By 1995 the eight largest sugar mills had amassed
$538 million in debt to three government agencies and an undisclosed amount to other
creditors, traders, and workers. In 1996 the newly elected government issued a legislative
decree, the Extraordinary Program of Tax Regularization (PERTA), offering cooperatives
three options for repaying their debt to government agencies:
a.  Cash payment of 40 percent of the debt (the other 60 percent would be forgiven;
b.  Capitalization of 30 percent of the debt, which would be converted to shares, with the
balance forgiven; and
c.  Installments of 20 percent up front, with payments extended over six years following a
two-year grace period (Chullen 1996).
24 The government of Uganda took a similar approach when privatizing its cotton industry. See Baffes (1998).
[Not in reference list)
26At the government's urging, almost all cooperatives voted to choose the second
option.  Private capital was, in general, available; however early on it became clear that the
poor management that often prompts privatization is also reflected in the firm's  financial
information management systems.  We take up this topic next.
The role of information in privatization.
During the initial stages of the privatization process in Peru, the procedures for
making and responding to private investor offers were unclear. As investors sought to line up
majority stakes, one company, the Kimberley Group, took to the street offering to purchase
shares of the medium-size sugar company Paramonga from workers and to pay social benefits
to retired workers. The ploy worked, and the firm bought about 55 percent of the workers'
shares for approximately $20 million. But the process raised concerns about whether workers
knew the  value of their shares and were aware of alternative offers. The National Supervisory
Commission on Companies and Securities (Conasev) then intervened and issued a month-long
suspension of share trading at Paramonga.
Investors faced difficulties of their own as well. First, a lack of financial and business
information, symptomatic of poor management practices, slowed decision-making. Firms
interested in purchasing shares found it difficult to value the firm because of poor record
keeping.25  Cooperative members faced similar difficulties in evaluating offers. Early on,
Conasev took an active role in getting information to the marketplace by requiring the sugar
companies to file audited financial reports. In addition the government established transition
committees at each estate to facilitate the privatization process. The interventions slowed the
privatization process, but by 1998 shares in all 12 of the sugar estates had been distributed.
Two of the estates were fully privatized in 1997.
Reforms, Research and Public Services
Pricing systems, as we have seen, create the incentives needed to improve the quality
of cane. The improvements generally come from enhanced management and the application
of existing technologies. The development, adaptation, and testing of new technologies are
common goods that can benefit all members of the industry, a fact that has long been
27recognized. Most sugar-producing countries have an established history of research-for
example Taiwan, which established the Sugar Cane Nursery and Trial Farm at Ta-mu-jiang
(Hsinhwa) in 1900. Similarly Egypt's  sugar research institute dates back to the 1930s.
In many countries where the government owns the sugar industry, the role of research
becomes bundled with market activities. In some cases governments and industry participants
fail to find a way to jointly fund research during the privatization process. Before privatization
in Mexico a single organization managed the research agenda for the sugar industry. With
privatization research became much more dispersed. Some is conducted at El Instituto
Nacional de Investigaciones Forestales, Agricolas y Pecuarias (INIFAP), some at universities
such as the Unidad de Inversiones, and some at a research station in Chiapas. In addition
almost every mill in the country conducts some research.
While the benefits of research are a common good, the government does not
necessarily need to finance it. Since the industry benefits directly from new research, industry
members are often willing to provide financing themselves-for  example through a
consumption or export levy-if  they also have a voice in setting research priorities. The
Mauritius Sugar Industry Research Institute is organized along these lines. 26 Following
recommendations made by the Mauritius Economic Commission in 1947, the sugar industry
decided to conduct its own research.  It founded the Mauritius Sugar Industry Research
Institute in 1953. The institute is financed by a cess on sugar production and is governed by a
Board of Directors with 10 members: seven representing millers, growers, and the Chamber
of Agriculture, and three representing the government.
Nationalized sugar mills sometimes provide services to local communities. During
privatization governments must be careful to ensure that  appropriate institutions take on these
tasks. Before privatization the sugar estates in Peru had provided electricity, education, and
health care and other social services to the community. And while the estates employed
around 35,000 workers, up to 215,00 family members and retirees were also directly
dependent on the services the estates provided. Although the process was slow and expensive,
25 Inadequate  record  keeping  is a common  problem  when  sugar  mills and estates are being privatized.  For
example  in Kenya  the government  was unable  to establish  clear title for several  of the sugar  parastatals.
26 Visit http://www.cgiar.org/isnar/hosted/msiri/msiri.htm to learn more about the Mauritius Sugar Industry
Research Institute.
28in Peru the government managed to transfer responsibilities to other organizations and
agencies. For example by 1996 Paramonga had transferred nine schools valued at $US 2.1
million to the Ministry of Education.
Lessons and Policy Recommendations
Unlike trade policies for coffee or cocoa, sugar policies are generally designed to
subsidize producers at the expense of consumers. Often the benefits are dissipated through
inefficient public ownership, captured by competing sweetener producers, or lost to rents on
land. Yet the accumulated effects of such policies also give rise to well-defined groups that
are dependent on continued interventions. Often these groups include entire communities that
depend on the continuation of existing policies in general and on the continuation of the local
mills in particular. Since reform usually means structural changes, including at least some mill
closings, the political and socials costs of reform are high. Consequently even though the
economic benefits of reform are significant, especially relative to costs, governments have
been reluctant to pursue reforms in sugar markets as readily as  reforms in other commodity
markets, such as coffee and cocoa.
In general the benefits of domestic reforms accrue primarily to consumers and the
economy at large through productivity increases that result when resources flow to optimal
uses. Recent experience suggest that sugar reforms are more likely when governments include
them in a package of overall market reforms designed to spur lagging economies (as occurred,
for instance, in Brazil, Mexico and Peru). Moreover governments will pursue true trade
liberalization when the costs of reform are relatively low for the industry and the benefits
more apparent, as was the case in Australia and Brazil.
Because sugar policies generally tax consumers to subsidize producers, the policies do
not directly affect the government budget. In fact import taxes often raise revenue. As a result
budgetary crises do not necessarily trigger reforms of sugar policy (grain subsidies, however,
are sensitive to budget constraints). However public ownership of sugar mills also places the
burden of new investment in the plants on the public ledger, and public funds are generally
limited and their availability unpredictable. As machinery depreciates and the efficiency of
such mills to decline, a crisis emerges.  Soon the need to raise capital spurs privatization. This
29experience has been repeated in much of Africa and Latin America, including Chad and
Kenya, Mexico and Peru.
Trade regimes and preferential trade agreements give rise to their own distortions, as
they did in Fiji, Mauritius, the Philippines, and St. Kitts. And reliance on the policies of other
countries can prove risky in the end.  When governments join or prepare to join regional trade
agreements, new distortions are often introduced, as happened in Mexico and Poland. In
contrast, the potential gains from multilateral trade liberalization are significant, and they
would accrue primarily to developing countries.
Because the consequences of reform differ from country to country, and because of
differences in initial conditions, no single blueprint exists for sugar market reforms. But
research overwhelmingly suggests that developing countries would benefit not only from
multilateral reform but also from unilateral reform. Realizing the potential gains from reform
requires establishing a framework that puts in place the proper incentives for both domestic
industries and international trade. Finding the political support for sugar reform requires
lowering the cost of the transition for those countries and groups most likely to bear a
disproportionate share of those costs,  especially the loss of income and wealth. Lessons from
earlier experiences suggest that a successful reform strategy has several components:
For multilateral reforms to sugar markets to succeed , developing countries will need
to push large sugar-producing and -consuming countries to change their domestic sugar
regimes. During the Uruguay Round negotiations, neither the EU nor the United States was
prepared to make significant changes to its domestic regime. In the end the round had a
limited effect on the global market.
The handful of countries that depend on special access to protected sugar markets will
require assistance during the reform process. When protected markets are lost, the
governments of these countries will not have the resources to soften the impact on the
industry, as Cuba's experience illustrates.
Even when subsidies exist-either  to protect consumers or because of preferential
trade agreements, countries must take unilateral action to limit the distortionary effects, as
Thailand's  experience shows.
30Sugar market reforms may entail reforms in other markets as well. The mix of Brazil's
sugar and energy policies is one example.
Clear analysis that identifies and quantifies the direct and indirect economic and
welfare impacts of policy changes can provide a consistent and objective framework for
negotiating change.  Australia's experience supports this notion.
Mills slated for privatization are often burdened with debt, or require large initial
capital improvements.  Governments provide added trade protection in order to improve the
profitability of domestic sugar firms, hoping  to entice private investors and speed
privatization. This approach taxes consumers and may support competing industries such as
corn sweeteners. Peru's experience shows that debt relief is a less distortionary alternative.
Information about asset values must be available during privatization. Investors need
accurate and timely information in order to make wise investment choices. As we saw the
Peruvian government addressed this issue by putting in place uniform reporting rules that
provide information to both buyers and sellers during privatization.
Services provided by large estates before privatization must be transferred to another
provider.  Sometimes large government-owned estates provide workers common goods such
as education and health care.. Peru's experience  shows that careful planning will minimize
disruptions in public services. In Mauritius the government also plays an organizing role in
privately financed research.
Governments must play a constructive role in resolving conflicts between producers
and mill owners.  The physical characteristics of sugar production can lead to conflicts that
often prompt poorly devised government interventions. To avoid such problems, governments
can follow Jamaica's example in setting cane-pricing rules, which create the proper economic
incentives.
Conclusions
Public interventions are commonplace in domestic and international markets for sugar.
The interventions are long-lived and rooted in historic trade arrangements, fears of shortages,
and conflicting interests between growers and sugar mills. Arrangements rooted in colonial
eras still shape policies and trade in the US, EU, and many developing countries. Responses
31to key events are frequently layered on old policies or sometimes give rise to new policies.
Over most of this century, most key events as well as economic thought on the role of
agriculture in development have encouraged accumulated interventions. Once put in place,
households and the value of investments become dependent on policies and institutions that
remain in place even as the usefulness of the policies and institutions fade. Still, experiments
with public ownership, common in many countries, have not been successful and most
countries have found public ownership of sugar-producing estates and mills untenable.
Further, successful experience with market liberalization in other commodity markets has
encouraged several countries to rethink existing sugar policies. As a result, most countries
have initiated some measure of market reform.
In addition, anticipated events related to NAFTA, Lome and the expansion of the EU
may bring about significant changes to the EU and US sugar regimes with cascading effects
for other countries. Countries dependent on the policies of other countries should learn from
Cuba's turbulent history and begin the difficult process of gaining independence.
Positive and complete lessons for sugar market reforms are not to be found in any
single country experience; however, successful solutions for each of several common
problems associated with sugar market reform can be found by drawing selectively on country
experiences.  Common problems include: the determination of cane quality; finding methods
of fairly sharing revenue from joint production; finding approaches to take advantage of
preferential trade arrangements while limiting negative consequences; identifying practices
that facilitate equitable and sustainable privatization; finding ways to finance and encourage
research and other activities with common benefits; and determining the relationship between
sugar market reforms and land, water, credit and other input markets.  Finally, the experiences
of many countries shows that market interventions arise for many reasons.  In some cases, the
circumstances that motivated past policies has changed, even when the consequences of those
interventions remain.  In other instances, the underlying problems that have motivated
interventions in the past may remain, even when policy makers realize current approaches
have failed.  Successful market reform goes beyond eliminating failed policies to finding
lasting solutions.
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41Figure 4.6 Production Swings in Cuba, 1960-96
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42Table 4.1 Producer and Consumer Subsidy Equivalents for Sugar, 1982-92 (U.S. dollars per metric ton)
1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992
Producer  subsidy  equivalents
Australia  16  18  20  17  22  19  26  27
Canada  13  10  5  20  7  8  7  9  9
Chile  150  113  12  106  127  118
Colombia  98  91  88  86  25  -26  -27  -21  -19
Czechoslovakia  -38  -59  -39  -96  -79  -17  -29
Egypt  -77  -55  -176  -205  -332  -27  -33  55
EC  43  50  89  110  164  181  55  14
Hungary  34  32  201  141  -40
Jamaica  -110  -133  -14  28  -21  -31  -72  -94
Japan  604  713  714  719  986  966  912  748  795
Kenya  -264  15  -8  97  96  63  63  -9
Nigeria  -310  -379  -403  -262  -221  73  73  106
Poland  -132  -39  16  -31  -91  -136  331
South Africa  -112  59  20  21  51  48  12  -62
Taiwan  0  178  214  281  292  196  292  396
United States  241  200  217  183  153  133  178  170  163
USSR  221  248  152  74  73
Yugoslavia  52  119  139  222  69  -126
Consumer subsidy equivalents
Canada  -25  -24  -23  -22  -23  -24  -22  -20  -18
China  -452  -335  -216  -180  -319  -264  -137  -226  -150
European Union  -338  -317  -350  -454  -570  -605  -398  -322
Jamaica  -55  -13  -78  -85  -54  -91  -4  77
Japan  -611  -521  -546  -523  -709  -831  -719  -491  -589
Nigeria  323  397  421  269  235  -66  -69  -118
Poland  -49  -89  -67  -64  -92  -71
South Africa  70  -125  -47  -66  -53  -68  -99  -17
South Korea  -642  -575  -427  -393  -406  -461  -256  -268  -306
Taiwan  -448  -533  -529  -366  -478  -604  -504  -551  -612
United States  -371  -303  -328  -275  -219  -186  -262  -252  -231
USSR  -138  -147  -81  -19  -20
Yugoslavia  -61  -44  -44  -80  -55  -30
Source: Earley and Westfall (1996).
43Table 4.3 Reductions in Sugar Export Subsidies Pledged during the Uruguay Round
Base  Reduction
'000 tons
Brazil  1,714  240  14
China  250  35  14
Colombia  257  36  14
EU  1,619  340  21
Hungary  165  134  81
Mexico  1,500  270  18
Poland  170  68  40
Romania  179  25  14
Slovak Republic  5  1  20
South Africa  890  187  21
Total  6,750  1,336  20
Source: Earley and Westfall (1996)










Congo (Brazzaville)  7,258
Costa Rica  30,374
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Subtotal  raw cane  sugar  2,097,121
Mexico (NAFTA)  25,000
Specialty sugars  1,656
Other refined sugars  20,344
Subtotal refined sugars  47,000
Total  2,119,115
Source: USDA
45Table  2.2: Results  of Selected  Studies  on Sugar  Trade  Liberalization.
Change in
Authors  Study period  Price effect  price  volatility  -- Scenario
Cents/lb.
% change  US$ 1990  % change
Snape (1963)  1959  16  3.04  n.a.  Subsidy through deficiency
payments
Valdes and Zietz (1980)  1975-77  6-8  2-3  n.a.  Liberalization by developed
countries
Koester and Schmitz (1982)  1975-77  12  4.18  n.a.  EUJ  Liberalization
Roberts and others (1982)  1968-81  7-11  2-3.5  na.  EU Liberalization
Matthews (1985)  1981  11  3.31  n.a.  EU Liberalization
Zietz and Valdes (1986)  1979-81  13-29  4-9  n.a.  Multicommodity  trade liberalization
for 17 industrial countries
Tyers and Anderson (1986)  1987  10%  0.78  -22  Liberalization by East Asia and
Westem Europe
OECD (1987)  1979-81  1  0.31  n.a.  Ten percent reduction in assistance
to OECD sugar producers
Webb, Ronigen and Dixit (1987)  1984  53  4.45  n.a.  Complete trade liberalization, 12
commodities
Huff and Moreddu (1990)  1982-85  25  4.5  n.a.  Multilateral trade liberalization
Martin and others (1990)  1980-83  60  9.1  n.a.  Multilateral trade liberalization
Lord and Barry (1990)  1990  10-30  1-4  n.a.  Multilateral trade liberalization
ABARE (1993)  2000 baseline  5.30  n.a.  n.a.  i-Implementation of Uruguay Round
agreement
USDA (1994)  2000 baseline  2  --5  n.a.  n.a.  Implementation of Uruguay Round
agreement
UNCTAD (1995)  2000 baseline  5  n.a.  n.a.  Implementation of Uruguay Round
agreement
Wong, Sturgis and Borrell (1989)  1985-2004  8  n.a.  -33  OECD price liberalization
simulation
Wong, Sturgis and Borrell (1989)  1985-2004  33  n.a.  -28  Liberalization of EU, Japanese, and
simulation  U.S. markets
Sources: Borrell and  Duncan (1992);  Gardner  (1993);  Harris  and Tangerman  (1993)  UNCTAD  (1994);  Jabara  and Valdes  (1993);
46Table 4.43: Promised Reductions in Tariff Bindings for Raw Sugar  (importing countries)
Country  Ad valorem equivalenta
1995  2000 (2004)
Algeria  35  n.a.
Canada  C$24.12/T  8.24
Cyprus  25  25
Egypt  20  20
Finland  n.a.  316
Indonesia  110  95
Iceland  350  175
Japan  337  287
Kenya  100  100
Korea RP  23.7  18
Kuwait  100  100
Macao  100  100
Malaysia  17  15
Mexico  120  96
Morocco  221  168
New Zealand  0  0
Niger  200  200
Nigeria  150  150
Norway  6  2
Pakistan  150  150
Peru
Romania  200  180
Senegal  30  30
Singapore  27  27
Suriname  20  20
Sweden  132  112
Switzerland  211  184
Tanzania  120  120
Tunisia  190  100
Uganda  80  80
USA  176  151
Uruguay  60  35
Venezuela  50  40
Average (%)  117  98
a. All figures are in percent unless otherwise indicated.
47Table 4.5: Promised reductions in Tariff Bindings (exporting countries)
Country  Ad valorem equivalent (%)a
1995  2000 (2004)
Antigua & Barcuda  100  100
Argentina  35  35
Australia  43  21.6
Austria  38  32
Barbados  160  122
Belize  60  60
Bolivia
Brazil  85  35
China  100  78
China TW
Colombia  117  117
Congo  30  30
Core d'lvoire  15  15
Cuba  40  40
Czech Republic  70  59.9
Ecuador
El Salvador  92  70
EU  221  176
Fiji  40  40
Gabon  60  60
Guatemala  100  100
Guyana  100  100
Honduras  35  35
Hungary  86  68
India  150  150
Jamaica  100  1o0
Madagascar  30  30
Mauritius  122 (+17%)  122 (+17%)
Nicaragua  120  100
Paraguay  35  35
Philippines  100  100
Poland  120  96
St. Vincent & Gran.  170  130
South Africa  124  105
Swaziland  124  105
Thailand  104  99
Trinidad  100  100
Turkey  150  135
Ukraine
Zambia  125  125
Average in %  92  79
a. Figures  are percent  unless  other'Wise indicated.
Source:  UNCTAD  (1997).
48Table 4.6 Selected Policy Variables for the Mexican-U.S. Agreement on Sugar Trade.
tariff rates for Mexican sugar exports  Duty-free quota  Mexican tariff rates  Common U.S.-
Mexican
Within quota  Above quota  Guaranteed] Potential  for high-fructose  import duty for
Raw  Refined  Raw  Refined  Raw equivalent  corn syrup  Third-party countries
Year  Cents per pound  tons  percent  NAFTA  Cents per pound
_  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  ____________________  I  y ear
1994  0  0  15.60  16.53  7,258  25,000  15.0  1  n.a.  n.a.
1995  0  0  15.20  16.11  7,258  25,000  13.5  2  n.a.  n.a.
1996  0  0  14.80  15.69  7,258  25,000  12.0  3  n.a.  n.a.
1997  0  0  14.40  15.26  7,258  25,000  10.5  4  n.a.  n.a.
1998  0  0  14.00  14.84  7,258  25,000  9.0  5  n.a.  n.a.
1999  0  0  13.60  14.42  7,258  25,000  7.5  6  n.a.  n.a.
2000  0  0  12.09  12.81  7,258  250,000  6.0  7  15.36  16.21
2001  0  0  10.58  11.21  7,258  250,000  4.5  8  15.36  16.21
2002  0  0  9.07  9.61  7,258  250,000  3.0  9  15.36  16.21
2003  0  0  7.56  8.01  7,258  250,000  1.5  10  15.36  16.21
2004  0  0  6.04  6.41  7,258  250,000  0.0  11  15.36  16.21
2005  0  0  4.53  4.81  7,258  250,000  0.0  12  15.36  16.21
2006  0  0  3.02  3.20  7,258  250,000  0.0  13  15.36  16.21
2007  0  0  1.51  1.60  7,258  250,000  0.0  14  15.36  16.21
2008  0  0  0.00  0.00  7,258  250,000  0.0  15  15.36  16.21Table  4.7 Payments  Systems  for Cane
Basis for sampling  & testing  Cane  Analysis  _
Individual  Average  of  Relative
Country  growers  growers  Direct  Indirect  Extraneous  payment  Basis  ofpayment  a  Valuation  of Canea
matter  scheme
Argentina  /  V  /  TRS  Negotiated TRS
Australia  b  V  /  /  CCS  Variable RS
Colombia: traditional  Weight of cane  Fixed RS
Colombia: new  I  TRS  Fixed RS
Fiji  I  Weight of cane  Fixed RS d
India  V  Weight of cane  Fixed cane price
Jamnaica  f  /  1  TRS  Variable RS
Mauritius  /  g  fa  TRS  Fixed RS
Mexico  I  TRS  Fixed  RS
Philippines  ,/  h  I  ,/  TRS  Fixed RS'
South Africa  I  IV  Cane sucrose Content  Fixed RS k
Thailand  /  V  /  /  '/  CCS  Fixed RS
US: Florida  I  Cane sucrose Content  Fixed RS
US: Louisiana  f  _  TRS  Fixed RS
Notes:  a. TRS  theoretically recoverable sugar; CCS  commercial cane sugar; RS = revenue share.
b. Individual samples of first-expressed  juice, factory average fiber for particular cane variety.
c. Individual samples of first-expressed  juice. This system is operating in several mills but not industrywide.
d. Fixed each year according to the industry average.
e. Fixed in some states regardless of factory recovery, in others determined by factory recovery.
f. By core/press method.
g. Cane testing for groups of growers when individual cane production is less than 500 mt per season.
h. Individual samples of first-expressed  juice, factory average fiber.
i. Fixed according to the mill's total sugar output.
j. Sample taken after cane preparation and before milling.
k. From 1994-95 based on proceeds from two pools; from 1998-99 based on a single average sugar price for domestic and export sales.
1.  Individual samples of first-expressed  juice, factory average fiber.
m. Fixed at the industry level at 70:30 grower:miller. However, the cane price earned by individual  growers takes account of individual CCS.
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